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Natural Disasters, Nuclear Disasters, and Global Governance 
Eric A. Feldman and Chelsea Fish 
I. Introduction 
In their provocative new book Transnational Legal Orders, Halliday and Shaffer (2014a; 
2014b) argue that in areas as diverse as civil rights, public health, financial stability, and trade 
policy, governments increasingly “reach beyond domestic to transnational legal norms” when 
crafting law and policy. They are not alone in noting the growing importance of what has come 
to be called global governance; scholars across a range of disciplines argue that transnational 
legal regimes have become increasingly important.1 This chapter uses the analytical framework 
of transnational legal ordering (TLO) developed by Halliday and Shaffer and applies it to the 
area of law and disasters. In contrast to the increasingly transnational legal nature of social 
ordering highlighted by Halliday and Shaffer, it argues that the emergence of transnational 
regulatory networks and cross-border principles or policies in the area of disaster management 
has been uneven and incomplete. Although there are many factors that help to explain why the 
law/disasters area has resisted the trend toward “transnationalization,” two stand out. One is the 
relative dearth of national laws and policies governing disaster management, which means that 
unlike other areas in which TLOs have emerged, there is an inadequate foundation of nation-
                                                        
1 See, e.g., Wai, Robert. 2005. Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society 
(2005). Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 46, pp.471-488 (characterizing transnational private law as one of 
many possible regimes in a global order and discussing its “public” or “social” function); 
Twining, William, Globalization & Legal Theory. 2000. London, England: Butterworths (discussing globalization 
and the law and noting the challenge of constructing “a conceptual framework and a meta-language of legal theory 
that can transcend legal cultures”); Shaffer, Gregory. 2014. “How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State,” in David 
Zaring and Francesca Bignami, eds., NAME OF This VOLUME. Oxford: Oxford University Press (setting forth a 
new analytic framework for discussing the “broader regulatory implications of the WTO within nation states”); 
(Zumbansen, Peer C. 2010. Transnational Legal Pluralism. Transnational Legal Theory, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 141-189, 
2010; CLPE Research Paper No. 01/2010. (discussing the concept of “transnational legal pluralism” as being 
distinct from that of international law);  
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specific laws and norms on which to build a transnational edifice. The second, closely related 
reason is that governments tend to “go it alone” when it comes to disaster management. Disasters 
can be difficult to predict, can carry an extraordinarily high price tag, can be geographically 
specific, and can affect people who lack the political clout to demand an official response. Rather 
than treating disaster management as an area of reciprocal risk in which the needs and interests 
of various countries are interdependent, therefore, nations generally manage disasters on an ad 
hoc, individual basis.  
As conceptualized by Halliday and Shaffer (2014a), a TLO is “a collection of formalized 
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding 
and practice of law across national jurisdictions.” More specifically, TLOs create an order in an 
area that relevant actors consider problematic; adopt a legal form—articulating norms by a 
transnational body that engages with national bodies—to address the problem; and are 
transnational because they cross over and penetrate state boundaries (Halliday and Shaffer, 
2014a). TLO formation depends upon the existence of precipitating conditions and facilitating 
circumstances (Halliday and Shaffer, 2014a). Applied to the area of law and disasters, 
precipitating conditions might include the occurrence of disasters, the political challenges that 
exist as the result of disasters, and the economic circumstances that accompany disasters. The 
likelihood that a disaster in one nation will affect other nations constitutes what Halliday and 
Shaffer call a facilitating circumstance, as do technological advances and innovations allowing 
for greater ease in coordination (Halliday and Shaffer, 2014b). Despite the existence of various 
precipitating conditions and facilitating circumstances, disaster management has largely resisted 
the type of global governance Halliday and Shaffer find so pervasive in other areas.   
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In exploring the apparent mismatch between the growing importance of TLOs described by 
Halliday and Shaffer (2014a; 2014b) and the reality of how nations individually and collectively 
manage disasters, this chapter roams broadly through the landscape of law and disasters. More 
specifically, it examines the state of TLO development in different stages of disaster 
management, particularly disaster prevention and preparedness, post-disaster emergency 
response, and victim compensation. It argues that the emergence of TLOs is most visible when it 
comes to post disaster emergency response, but is far less visible in other areas, most notably and 
ubiquitously in victim compensation.  
 The chapter first turns to the creation of TLOs for natural and nuclear disasters, surveying 
the areas of disaster prevention and preparedness, immediate disaster response, and victim 
compensation. It finds that for both types of disasters a modest degree of coordinated 
transnational regulation has developed in the area of disaster preparedness/prevention, targeted at 
minimizing potential physical injury and property damage, and that the transnational network of 
international organizations addressing the immediate response to natural disasters is more robust 
than that for nuclear disasters. Victim compensation, targeted at paying for disaster-related 
resulting personal injury and property damage, generally lacks a global regulatory structure.   
Next, the chapter uses the Japanese response to the nuclear accident in Fukushima to 
illustrate the inadequacies of national and global nuclear disaster preparedness and management, 
and to highlight the potential for a more robust scheme. An administrative structure for 
managing nuclear disasters was developed by the international community in the 1950s as a way 
of enabling governments and nuclear energy providers to assure the public that the potential risks 
of nuclear energy were internalized by the owners/operators of nuclear facilities. But the 
structure is both incomplete and inadequate. Japan’s inadequate disaster preparedness and its 
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poor performance in handling post disaster compensation underscore both the failure of 
translational legal norms in the area of nuclear disaster policy—because they are absent or 
insufficient—and how such norms could help nations manage the inevitable occurrence of 
disasters.  
Third, the chapter turns to both the French regulatory response to natural disasters and the US 
response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which despite their differences suggest the potential for a 
more coordinated transnational approach to disaster management. Implemented in 1982, 
France’s disaster insurance system now covers more than 90% of French citizens. Among its 
more distinctive qualities is that it is relatively inexpensive for consumers, provides them with 
guaranteed payments for property damage in the event that they are victims of disasters, reduces 
the potential financial burden on the government in the aftermath of natural disasters, and 
reasserts the values of community and solidarity by creating a national pool of insured. Similarly, 
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which compensates individuals physically 
injured or killed by the 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attacks, was also animated by the 
concept of solidarity. The success of these programs illustrates that there may be identifiable 
international norms, like solidarity, that could be successfully harnessed by domestic and global 
actors to build a transnational legal regime in the area of disaster management, a regime that is 
flexible enough to account for the varying economic structures and social values of disaster-
affected countries. 
Finally, the chapter suggests several reasons why the areas of disaster 
prediction/preparedness and post-disaster compensation appear to be more resistant to global 
regulatory regimes than that of post-disaster emergency response, and asks under what 
circumstances a coordinated and consistent transnational regulatory apparatus might develop in 
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the area of law and disasters. It underscores why some categories of disasters may be more likely 
to develop a transnational regulatory regime, and uses the French system of disaster insurance 
and the U.S. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund to illustrate the possibility that 
transnational legal norms could in the future serve as the basis for the development of TLOs in 
the law/disasters areas.   
II. Disaster Management: Global Governance, Global Rules?  
The capacity of human beings to deny, ignore or minimize potentially unpleasant and 
undesirable experiences is vividly on display in how they approach the possibility of being 
affected by disasters.2 Floods, heat waves, hurricanes, nuclear meltdowns, tsunamis, earthquakes, 
tornadoes, volcanoes, hail, drought—despite Biblical warnings and the regular occurrence of 
devastating events, we seem content to act as if disasters are always someone else’s problem 
(King James Bible, Matt. 24.7).3 When offered the chance to individually insure against them, 
we generally refuse unless given no choice.4 Collectively, we are either uninterested in 
constructing forward-looking administrative schemes to manage disasters, or create ill-
considered and underfunded programs. In a global environment characterized by increasingly 
                                                        
2 According to the United Nation’s International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, “In the past two decades, on 
average more than 200 million people have been affected every year by natural hazards. These disasters have caused 
a massive loss of life and negative long-term social, economic and environmental consequences.” United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, About the International Early Warning Programme, 
http://www.unisdr.org/2006/ppew/iewp/about-iewp.htm (accessed September 28, 2014). See also Douglas, 
Lawrence, Austin Sarat, and Martha Merrill Umphrey. 2007. “A Jurisprudence of Catastrophe: An Introduction,” in 
Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey, eds., Law and Catastrophe. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press (listing a range of recent catastrophes and noting that the term “catastrophe” encompasses both 
natural and human occurrences and is not limited by a specific temporal dimension). 
3 “For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom: and there shall be famines, and pestilences, 
and earthquakes, in divers places…” Matt. 24.7, The Holy Bible: King James Version. 2001. Iowa Falls, IA: World 
Bible Publishers.  
4 See, e.g., Schwartz, Reimund and Gert G. Wagner, The Political Economy of Natural Disaster Insurance: Lessons 
from the Failure of a Proposed Compulsory Scheme in Germany 3-5 (German Inst. for Econ. Research, Discussion 
Paper No. 620, 2006) (arguing that a sufficient degree of insurance coverage can only be achieved by some form of 
state intervention in the market, particularly by making insurance mandatory). 
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interwoven regulatory frameworks for financial institutions, we treat the cost of disasters as an 
afterthought, something that can be managed in an ex post, ad hoc manner, even though it is 
clear that the consequences of disasters—the human toll they exact and the financial cost they 
impose—can challenge even the wealthiest nations. 
This section describes and compares the existence (or lack thereof) of transnational legal 
regimes in key areas of disaster management— prediction/prevention, emergency response, and 
victim compensation—with reference to both natural and nuclear disasters. It argues that to the 
degree a structure of global governance has emerged it is inconsistent and incomplete, with the 
most well-developed TLOs in the area of disaster response and the least developed in the area of 
victim compensation. Although some categorization and distinction is necessary when analyzing 
disasters, it is important to acknowledge that the borders separating different types of disasters 
are often blurry (Faure, 2013).5 The occurrence of a flood may be a “natural” disaster, for 
example, but the damage it causes is almost always to the built, “unnatural,” environment. In the 
same way, a meltdown at a nuclear plant may be a “nuclear” disaster, but it can be triggered by 
an earthquake or some other “natural” event. Even the “natural” category can be misleading in 
that it may include “man-made” disasters that damage the “natural” environment, such as oil 
spills.  Similarly, the distinction between preparing for and responding to a disaster can be 
opaque, as can that between immediately responding to a disaster and compensating victims after 
a disaster has occurred. Because some categorization is necessary to enable an analysis of 
                                                        
5 See Faure, Michael. 2013. “Introduction: Towards Effective Compensation for Victims of Natural Catastrophes in 
Developing Countries,” in Michael Faure and Andri Wibisana, eds., Regulating Disasters, Climate Change and 
Environmental Harm: Lessons from the Indonesian Experience. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 
(describing various categories of disaster and noting that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between those that 
are “man-made” and those that are “natural”). 
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disaster management, however, this chapter will make use of these distinctions while remaining 
attentive to their shortcomings.  
A. NATURAL DISASTERS 
1.Disaster Prediction/Prevention  
 Efforts at developing global governance mechanisms for the prediction and prevention of 
natural disasters have resulted in a patchwork of multilateral and bilateral agreements between 
sovereign states and between sovereign states and regional and international organizations (de 
Guttry, 2012). Including formal treaties, political commitments, and memoranda of 
understanding, these agreements often lack an enforcement mechanism and tend to focus on 
narrow issues relevant to regions or sub-regions (de Guttry, 2012). In part because vulnerability 
to specific types of natural disasters (floods, fires, earthquakes, etc.) varies with location, a 
shared sense of risk and responsibility tends to exist, if at all, between and among states that are 
geographically proximate. The Caribbean region, for example, concluded the Convention for the 
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region in 1983, 
which requires contracting states to take all necessary measures to respond to either the threat of 
pollution or existing pollution in the Convention area (art. 11).6 But a key part of that Convention 
involves a Protocol for responding to oil spills, and it fails both to specify the obligations of 
contracting parties in the event of a major spill and to create a mechanism to ensure that parties 
fulfill their obligations (art. 3).7 Furthermore, it encourages, rather than requires, signatories to 
harmonize their national policies in order to achieve the goals of the Convention (art. 4). 
                                                        
6 This convention is a good example of the blurry boundaries between different types of disasters. Most observers 
would consider not consider an oil spill a “natural” disaster. But the results of a spill—harm to wildlife, water 
quality, and more—do seem to fit the definition of a natural disaster.  
7 For example, Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Protocol states that “Contracting Parties shall, within their capabilities, 
establish and maintain, or ensure the establishment and maintenance of, the means of responding to oil spill 
incidents and shall endeavour to reduce the risk thereof. Such means shall include the enactment, as necessary, of 
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States within a particular region or sub-region, for example, are likely to share pre-existing 
institutional architecture, which facilitates the creation of governance mechanisms for the 
information sharing and risk assessment/reduction that are essential to the prevention and 
prediction of natural disasters. The states within the MERCOSUR sub-region, for example, 
signed the Protocolo Adicional al Acuerdo Marco sobre Medio Ambiente de MERCOSUR en 
Materia de Cooperación y Asistencia Frente a Emergencias Ambientales (“Additional Protocol 
to the Framework Agreement on the Environment of MERCOSUR on Cooperation and 
Assistance Facing Environmental Emergencies”), which includes provisions on disaster 
prevention and management (arts. 4–8). It has only been ratified by Argentina and Paraguay. 
Pre-existing institutional architecture may facilitate the creation of transnational regulatory 
mechanisms. It does not, however, guarantee effective implementation. 
One international effort that is suggestive of what a well-developed TLO for disaster 
prediction and prevention might, and perhaps should, include, is the United Nation’s 2005 World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction, which ended with the adoption of the International Early 
Warning Programme.8 The Programme has the laudable aim of developing a transnational 
system of early warnings when disasters are imminent, building on existing infrastructure and of 
integrating early warning “into policy, into legal frameworks, and into fully described chains of 
decision making (UNISDR, 2004).” In order to do so, specific proposals were developed for five 
                                                        
relevant legislation, the preparation of contingency plans, the identification and development of the capability to 
respond to an oil spill incident and the designation of an authority responsible for the implementation of this 
Protocol.” The vagueness of this and other provisions render the agreement largely hortatory. Protocol Concerning 
Cooperation in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region, with Annex, art. 3, Mar. 24, 1983, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,085, 1506 U.N.T.S. 157 (entered into force Oct. 11, 1986). 
  
8 See “UN Launches Plans for Global Early Warning System on Natural Disasters,” UN News Centre, Jan. 19, 2005, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=13077&Cr=natural&Cr1=disaster#.UknokYlev0E (describing the 
International Early Warning Programme and the 2004 tsunami that motivated the Programme’s creation).  
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focus areas, including “(1) better integration of early warning … into development processes and 
public policies; (2) improved data availability for investigating, forecasting/predicting, and 
managing risks on different time sales; (3) improved capacities and strengthened early warning 
systems, particularly in developing countries; (4) development of people-centered warning 
systems; and (5) mechanisms for sustaining early warning dialogue and supporting the 
development and implementation of a programme (UNISDR, 2004).” Despite the ambitious 
agenda, the Programme does not specifically address the consequences of disasters once they 
strike. It further conceptualizes the implementation of an internationally coherent early warning 
program as a platform by which to secure the long term benefits of sustainable development.9 
Advancing sustainable development agendas would ostensibly be achieved by strengthening 
national and transnational infrastructure and ameliorating the effects of damage caused by 
disasters insofar as such damage hinders national economic capacity (UNISDR, 2004). 
2. Post Disaster Emergency Response 
A relatively robust and well-settled transnational regulatory regime exists for the provision 
of emergency relief in the post disaster context. Globally, a large number of organizations are 
dedicated to the provision of humanitarian relief immediately following a disaster, including the 
International Red Cross, Oxfam, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, and many more. 
These agencies are important in providing support for victims of major disasters, particularly 
those in the developing world that pose an imminent threat to life. They can also be effective in 
                                                        
9 For example, the Programme advocated for and developed plans to create an early warning system for tsunamis. 
The United Nations had previously adopted in December 1999 the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction for 
this same purpose. See United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction,. “What is the International Strategy?” 
UNISDR. http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/international-strategy-for-disaster-reduction (accessed Sept. 29, 2013) 
(specifying that the vision of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction is “[t]o enable all communities to 
become resilient to the effects of natural, technological and environmental hazards”). 
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the short term by providing food, clean water, sanitation, and shelter to disaster victims. Their 
importance is underscored by the emergency response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and 
Tsunami, in which 78 countries, 30 organizations, and an unprecedented number of direct 
private donors contributed more that $1.6 billion in aid (Athukorala and Resosduarmo, 2005; 
Stoianova, 2012). In subsequent years, the role of private aid in humanitarian disaster relief has 
continued to grow. From 2006 to 2010, for example, private funding as a share of the total 
humanitarian response grew from 17% to 32%, respectively (Stoianova, 2012). 
Unfortunately, these organizations are poorly integrated and are beset by coordination 
problems, as the international response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti demonstrates.  
Coordination of the Haiti relief effort depended upon two organizations: the United Nations, 
which uses its “Cluster System” to attempt to avoid duplication of efforts and competition for 
resources, and the U.S. military, which controlled the airport and took on the role of a de facto 
coordinator. Unfortunately, those organizations struggled to coordinate distribution of 
humanitarian aid when confronted with the scale of the destruction (Beiser, 2010). John Holmes, 
the head of the UN agency overseeing the Cluster System, commented in an internal email, “I 
was disappointed to find that despite my calls for the Global Cluster Lead Agencies to strengthen 
their cluster coordination capacity on the ground, very little progress has been made in this 
critical area … this is beginning to show and is leading others to doubt our ability to deliver” 
(Lynch, 2010). The response of the international community and that of Haitian civil society and 
government, especially at the local level, was also poorly coordinated; therefore, local capacity 
to facilitate the relief effort was not maximally utilized (Patrick, 2011).10  
                                                        10 Patrick, John. 2011. “Haiti Earthquake Response: Emerging Evaluation Lessons,” Evaluation Lessons 5, 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/haiti/50313700.pdf (Holmes further states that “it's clear that there remain major 
unmet humanitarian needs," and that all 12 clusters continue to "struggle without the capacity required to coordinate 
efficiently the large number of partners involved in the operation. One month into the response, only a few clusters 
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The agreements for post-disaster emergency response that do exist, regionally and 
internationally, tend to be circumscribed and weak. The South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), for example, representing Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, in November 2011 proposed the Agreement on Rapid 
Response to Natural Disasters (SAARC, 2012). As stated in Article II of the Agreement, its 
objective is “to provide effective regional mechanisms for rapid response to disasters to achieve 
substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and in the social, economic, and environmental 
assets of the Parties, and to jointly respond to disaster emergencies through concerted national 
efforts and intensified regional cooperation…” But the Agreement is primarily hortatory; 
signatories are not required to earmark funds or even participate in cooperative disaster relief 
efforts. Even so, the agreement will not go into effect until it is signed by all members, and as of 
May 2013 it still lacked several signatures (SAARC Secretariat, 2013).  
Another example of regional coordination is the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution, Preparedness, and Response in the Arctic, a treaty negotiated between the eight 
member states of the Arctic Council in May 2013. The Agreement requires each state to establish 
measures for dealing with pollution incidents and to coordinate with each other in the event of a 
spill (arts. 1, 4). Although the agreement hints at a treaty approach to dealing with regional 
disasters, it does not introduce any new substantive obligations beyond those required by the 
1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation, a treaty already 
ratified by all eight member states. Moreover, the measures themselves are likely to be 
insufficient given the challenges of mounting a large-scale response to a major oil spill in the 
                                                        
have fully dedicated cluster coordinators, information management focal points and technical support capacity, all of 
which are basic requirements for the efficient management of a large scale emergency operation."). 
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Arctic environment. These shortcomings have led to calls for a more effective Arctic-wide treaty 
focused on the prevention of oil spills by forcing off-shore drilling companies to internalize the 
risk created by their operations (Byers, 2012). 
3. Victim Compensation 
Unlike disaster prevention/preparedness and emergency response, transnational regulatory 
regimes for compensating victims of natural disasters are largely non-existent. The international 
instruments that do exist tend to relate to the allocation of inter-state liability rather than to 
mechanism for providing compensation for individual victims. Because incentives for 
transnational coordination are particularly weak, the bulk of compensation—when it is paid—is 
provided by individual nations to people within their borders. Sovereign disaster financing 
instruments can aid governments in disaster planning. Contingent credit mechanisms—for 
example, the World Banks Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (CAT-DDO) loans—allow 
governments to set aside funds that would be available immediately in the wake of a disaster to 
complement other national reserves and facilitate compensation payments. However, these 
payments are earmarked for and disbursed to individuals within a specific nation state (World 
Bank, 2014). 
In most cases, however, individuals are not compensated for either personal injuries or 
property losses. Some may rely on insurance, when available. The Turkish Catastrophe 
Insurance Pool (TCIP), a public-private partnership between the Turkish government and the 
private insurance industry, has increased catastrophe related insurance coverage from less than 
3% to over 23% nationwide (World Bank, 2013). However, many standard private insurance 
policies exclude certain types of catastrophic risk. Property damage, for example, is excluded 
from coverage under standard U.S. property insurance policies if it stems from disasters such as 
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floods and earthquakes, even though the private insurance market for narrowly-tailored natural 
disaster policies is extremely limited (Sugarman, 2006). Even when insurance is available, 
individuals tend to underinsure either because they underestimate the risk of low-probability-
high-loss events like natural disasters or because they (whether realistically or not) expect 
financial assistance from government agencies and private charities (Raschky and Schwindt, 
2009). 
In some cases, ad hoc disaster relief from non-governmental organizations, international 
organizations, national governments, and (increasingly) private donors may also be channeled to 
disaster-affected countries, particularly in the developing world. These funds, parceled out 
through private charity or governmental relief programs, provide limited monetary relief to 
disaster victims (Becerra, Cavallo, and Noy, 2012).11 For example, Tamil Nadu, one of the states 
most heavily affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, incurred personal injury and property 
losses totaling USD 104 billion (Naidu, 2005). 12 The Indian government launched an impressive 
relief effort to compensate for death, injury, and loss of livelihood and property, yet the aid was 
often insufficient to fully restore income from lost livelihoods (Naidu, 2005).13 Fishermen 
                                                        
11 See Becerra, Oscar, Eduardo Cavallo, and Ilan Noy. 2012. Foreign Aid in the Aftermath of Large Natural 
Disasters 1–2 (Inter-American Development Bank, Department of the Chief Economist, IDB Working Paper Series 
No. IDB-WP-333), http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/10593.pdf (noting that although official 
development assistance (ODA) flows tend to “surge” after large natural disasters, aid surges typically cover only 3% 
of the estimated economic damages). 
12  In India 12,405 people were killed by the tsunami and about 5,640 were reported missing. In Tamil Nadu, 5 
districts suffered the most severe damage, including Chennai (250 deaths), Kancheepuram (250 deaths), Cuddalore 
(500 deaths), Kanyakumari (1,000 deaths), and Nagapattinam (6,000 deaths). Out of the 200,000 homes destroyed 
by the tsunami, 190,000 of these were in Tamil Nadu. Similarly, out of the 83,788 boats destroyed, 52638 were in 
Tamil Nadu, which devastated costal fishing communities. Inland agricultural areas were not spared, and several 
thousand acres were damaged by salt water, a large portion of which were located in Tamil Nadu. Naidu, V. 
Chandrasekara. 2005. “Country Report: India,” in Laurel Fletcher, Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein, eds., After the 
Tsunami: Human Rights of Vulnerable Populations. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley East 
West Center, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Publications_After-the-Tsunami_10-2005.pdf. 
13 Details of relief effort include the following: the central government establishing a one-time relief package for all 
tsunami affected families that consisted of a cash grant of INR 4000 (USD 91.95), along with rice, fuel, and basic 
household supplies (cooking stoves, vessels for fetching water, etc.); issuing individual relief package of INR 1,000 
(approx. USD 23) and material relief worth INR 526 (USD 12) / family for three months following the tsunami; 
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devastated by the loss were eligible to receive a new fiberglass boat valued at INR 150,000 for 
groups of four fishermen, although they did not receive nets, valued at INR 5000 to 10,000, 
without which they were not able to resume productive activity (Naidu, 2005). Compensation is 
also unevenly distributed, with many individuals and families, often the most vulnerable, left to 
fend for themselves. For example, studies of aid distribution in tsunami-affected districts of 
Tamil Nadu post tsunami revealed that between 1% to 8% of individuals entitled to government 
aid had been denied on the basis of caste, religion, or occupation (Naidu, 2005).14 
a. Compensation at the National Level 
The extremely modest international effort to develop a transnational regulatory structure to 
govern compensation for natural disaster victims is echoed at the national level. The Japanese 
experience is illustrative, highlighting the lack of consistency and coordination that is the norm 
in many nations when it comes to national regulatory responses to natural disasters. This reality 
is surely not because disasters are infrequent in Japan. To the contrary, throughout its history 
Japan has experienced a wide range of devastating natural calamities that have razed cities and 
caused terrible human suffering. Many have been caused by earthquakes, which is to be expected 
                                                        
establishing a special relief fund from which the next of kin for each deceased family member received a one-time 
payment of INR 100,000 (USD 2,290) each to next of kin for a family member tsunami casualty; providing owners 
of machine boats compensated between INR 30,000 (USD  687) and 500,000 (USD 11,450) depending on extent of 
damage; providing owners of fiberglass boasts and catamarans compensation between INR 25,000 (USD 572.50), 
32,000 (USD 732.80), or 75,000 (USD 1717.50) depending on extent of damage; and the state government 
constructing new houses for tsunami survivors in general. Naidu, V. Chandrasekara. 2005. “Country Report: India,” 
in Laurel Fletcher, Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein, eds., After the Tsunami: Human Rights of Vulnerable 
Populations. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley East West Center, 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Publications_After-the-Tsunami_10-2005.pdf. 
14 Naidu, V. Chandrasekara. 2005. “Country Report: India,” in Laurel Fletcher, Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein, 
eds., After the Tsunami: Human Rights of Vulnerable Populations. Human Rights Center, University of California, 
Berkeley East West Center, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Publications_After-the-Tsunami_10-2005.pdf, 
at 18 (A poor fisherman commented, “The tsunami did not discriminate against people in its devastation or fury but 
the rich and powerful have discriminated against us in securing aid.”). See also Asian Human Rights Commission 
Commission & Asian Legal Resource Centre. 2005. “In the Wake of the Tsunami, Deception and Discrimination,” 4 
Article 2, n.1, Feb. 2005, at 1, 33 (documenting caste discrimination in the distribution of relief supplies after the 
tsunami).  
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for a country resting on a web of fault lines. But the frequency of tremors and the regularity of 
damaging quakes have not triggered an embrace of a coordinated plan when they strike. In 1993, 
for example, an earthquake and resulting tsunami off the cost of Japan’s northernmost island, 
Hokkaido, killed close to two hundred people living on the island of Okushiri and destroyed 
most homes on the island (Nakao, 2013). The targeted nature of the losses—the personal and 
property harms on Okushiri were devastating, but compared to many disasters the overall scope 
of the losses was modest—made it a relatively easy case for a comprehensive governmental 
response. Without any legal or regulatory mechanism for providing relief to earthquake or 
tsunami victims, however, the only payments forthcoming were small private donations allocated 
by the local government. 
A similar situation can be seen in the aftermath of Japan’s deadliest postwar earthquake, the 
1995 Hanshin (Kobe) quake. As a result of that earthquake, 6,000 people died, 40,000 were 
injured, and almost 400,000 lost their homes (Edgington, 2010). Election year politics may have 
factored in to the decision to spend more than usual on reconstructing Kobe’s infrastructure.15 
Like those in Okushiri who suffered personal injury or property loss, however, there was little 
aid forthcoming. Victims received just $2,500 per family from the Japanese Red Cross, along 
with a token condolence payment (“mimaikin”) authorized by the Japan Legislature (“Diet”) as 
part of the reconstruction budget.16   
                                                        
15 See Edgington, David W. 2010. Reconstructing Kobe: The Geography of Crisis and Opportunity. Vancouver: 
UBC Press at 85–86 (“For some commentators, the reasons [for Japan’s expenditures on infrastructure] had to do 
with the fact that 1995 was an election year in Japan.  The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), then in a coalition 
with the Japan Socialist Party, felt that it would gain politically by providing subsidies to the Kobe region…”). 
16 Condolence payments (mimaikin) are clearly distinguished from compensation because they are given as an 
expression of sympathy rather than an effort to make the victim whole.  For Kobe earthquake victims, the payments 
were five million yen to families that lost the head of household, and 2.5 million yen for those who lost a family 
member.  The exchange rate of U.S. dollars to yen (as of Nov. 18, 2014) is 1:116.87.  Currencies Center, Yahoo! 
Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-converter (accessed Nov. 18, 2014).  
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In the absence of specific laws or administrative structures for addressing the human toll 
exacted by earthquakes, one might imagine that individuals would turn to insurance companies 
to fill the gap. Earthquake insurance is available in Japan, but not everywhere or to everyone, 
and not always at an appealing price.17 In the recently devastated area of Tohoku, for example, 
rocked by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and huge tsunami in 2011, only 19.6% of homeowners 
had purchased earthquake insurance (Yoneyama, 2011). Neither prior to nor in the aftermath of 
that quake has there been a serious move to mandate such insurance.  
Also absent is any evidence of political will to create a regulatory structure to provide some 
degree of post-earthquake compensation for personal injury or property loss. There has, of 
course, been a governmental response to the 3/11 disaster: roads and other infrastructure are 
being rebuilt (though far too slowly, many claim), and compensation funds for a subset of 
Fukushima victims have been secured through domestic and international private donations. 
What one does not find, however, is a thoughtful, coordinated, and predictable system that could 
help to minimize the likelihood of earthquake-related harms and manage those that occur. When 
(not if) the next major earthquake rocks Japan, neither individuals nor the state will be prepared.   
The absence of legal rules, principles, and institutions to undergird a regulatory structure for 
disaster management in Japan—beyond a laisse-faire approach that places the burden of disaster-
related harms on individuals—is not confined to earthquakes and tidal waves. The 1959 Isewan 
Typhoon was one of the worst natural disasters in Japan’s history, killing over 5,000 people, 
                                                        
17 See Mahul, Olivier and Emily White. Knowledge Notes, Cluster 6: Earthquake Risk Insurance 6 (World Bank, 
Note 6-2, Sept. 24, 2012),  (The premium rates for earthquake insurance provided by private nonlife insurance 
companies are risk based, depending on location of the dwelling (eight risk zones) and the type of construction 
(wooden or non-wooden). For example, the annual premiums for a non-wooden dwelling in Nagazaki Prefecture and 
a wooden dwelling in Tokyo are JPY 5,000 and JPY 31,000, respectively. The rates include a pure premium rate and 
a loading rate (though because the program is not-for-profit the rates do not include loading for profit). These rates 
are still considered high because of Japan’s high exposure to earthquakes.). 
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injuring 40,000, and destroying 120,000 homes (Japan Water Forum, 2005). In its aftermath, the 
government mounted a major reconstruction effort but did not offer any monetary compensation 
to victims for death, injury, or property damage. In fact, Japan’s elite bureaucracy does not 
appear to find the entire spectrum of natural disasters a particularly worthwhile target for a 
regulatory response; unlike the attention lavished on the legal and regulatory structure of Japan’s 
financial system over the past decade, managing disasters has been a low/no priority item.  
 In sum, despite the existence of a relatively well-developed transnational regime for 
emergency response to disasters, global governance mechanisms are relatively weak and 
underdeveloped for prediction/prevention and practically non-existent for victim compensation. 
When transnational agreements do exist, particularly in the realm of disaster 
prediction/prevention, they are narrow and circumscribed in scope, focusing on geographically 
proximate threats most often conceptualized regionally. What is more, despite relying on 
previously existing regional institutional architecture, many of these agreements—because they 
are not binding, fail to include all the relevant players, or do not include comprehensive 
provisions or mechanisms—cannot be implemented effectively.  
In terms of victim compensation, one finds few examples of transnational efforts to develop 
coordinated approaches to compensation, and that lack of structure is echoed at the national 
level. In addition, insurance-based approaches to managing the costs of disaster-related harms 
have also been neglected. Even the area of emergency response, where existing transnational 
governance mechanisms enjoy widespread buy-in and acceptance, suffers from coordination 
problems stemming from the sheer number of players and the failure to agree on and implement 
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best practices. Finally, in those cases in which transnational norms do exist, they generally fail to 
filter down and gain acceptance at sub-national levels of social organization.18  
NUCLEAR DISASTERS 
 
1. Nuclear Disaster Prediction/Prevention  
The difficulty of predicting when and where a nuclear accident will occur has led to the 
creation of global governance mechanisms that seek to promote nuclear safety and ease public 
concerns through information sharing and voluntary adherence to safety standards articulated in 
multilateral treaties and by industry organizations.19 While laudable in their goals, these 
relatively new transnational regulatory regimes may not lead to buy-in from nations interested in 
acquiring nuclear capabilities as the acceptance of nuclear energy rebounds in the aftermath of 
the Fukushima accident.  
International cooperation on issues of nuclear safety is spearheaded by two treaties 
concluded under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The first, the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety, was adopted on June 17, 1994, and entered into force on October 
24, 1996 (IAEA, 2014b).20 The Convention requires the 76 ratifying nations to implement 
specific safety rules and standards at their nuclear energy facilities, including site selection, 
emergency preparedness, and operation and safety verification (art. 14–19).21 The second, the 
                                                        
18 See Halliday & Shaffer (2014a) at 2 (discussing “normative settlement,” which they relate to the production of a 
legal order at different levels of social organization). 
19 For a survey of major international legal conventions on the regulation of nuclear energy, see Cook, Helen. 2014. 
“International Nuclear Law: Nuclear Safety, Emergency Response and Nuclear Liability,” in Simon Butt, Hitoshi 
Nasu, and Luke Nottage, eds., Asia-Pacific Disaster Management: Comparative and Socio-legal Perspectives. 
London: Springer. 
20 See International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). International Conventions and Legal Agreements: Convention 
on Nuclear Safety, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/nuclearsafety.html (last updated Nov. 
6, 2014) [Hereinafter Convention on Nuclear Safety] (providing background information on the treaty). 
21 Id. Cuba, Egypt, Israel, Sudan, and Syria are among several nations that have signed but not ratified it. IAEA. 
Latest Status: Convention on Nuclear Safety, http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/nuclearsafety_status.pdf (last 
change of status Jan. 9, 2014) (accessed Oct. 16, 2014). 
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Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radiological 
Waste Management, entered into force in June 2001, and requires contracting parties to attend 
review meetings and submit reports describing measures taken to implement the Joint 
Convention’s obligations (arts. 29–34).22  
While the two Conventions have been heralded as milestones in the development of 
nuclear energy law, both establish relatively general safety requirements and seek to ensure 
compliance not through the imposition of sanctions but by emphasizing that nations have a 
common interest in achieving higher levels of safety (Pelzer, 1994).23 As so-called “incentive 
conventions,” that common interest is underscored by a system of peer review through which 
contracting nations hold regular meetings to discuss and review each other’s reports concerning 
their obligations (Pelzer, 1994). This mechanism is “the main innovative and dynamic element” 
of the two Conventions, and was designed to de-emphasize coercive enforcement (IAEA, 
2014a). The expectation of the drafters is that over time, inclusivity and cooperation will result in 
deeper and more ambitious commitments among contracting parties (Handl, 2004). 
Other organizations emphasize safety-related cooperation between nuclear power 
operators, and exist at both the international and national level. The most significant institution 
internationally is the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), a non-profit group of 
nuclear power plant operators, reactor vendors, and other organizations involved with nuclear 
safety that promotes information sharing as a means of enhancing safety standards in the 
                                                        
22 See IAEA. International Conventions and Legal Agreements: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 
http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/joint-convention-safety-spent-fuel-management-and-
safety-radioactive-waste (last updated Nov. 6, 2014) [Hereinafter Joint Convention] (providing background 
information on the treaty). 
23 See, e.g., Pelzer, Norbert. 1994. “Nuclear Energy,” 5 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 195, 197 
(discussing the Convention on Nuclear Safety as an important accomplishment in nuclear energy law). 
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industry. Each organization submits event reports and information to a regional center, and any 
trends or concerns that emerge from those reports are flagged as recommendations to the general 
membership. In the wake of Fukushima, WANO (2014) stepped up its review process, moving 
towards peer reviews every four years, with a two-year follow up.  
 A number of other ad hoc, narrow initiatives are designed to promote the overarching 
goal of nuclear safety. They include, among others, a 2011 pledge by international operators to 
support a collaborative effort to standardize reactor design as a means of enhancing nuclear 
safety, as well as the creation of the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters' Principles of Conduct under 
the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which was signed onto by 12 
companies currently exporting nuclear reactors and sets forth best practices in safety, security, 
and environmental management (World Nuclear Association, 2014). Initiatives such as these, 
though relatively new, are indicative of the ways in which the private sector has become 
involved in catalyzing coordinated transnational regulation for nuclear safety. 
2. Nuclear Disaster Response 
Transnational regulatory coordination with respect to nuclear disasters is even less 
developed than the multi-faceted regulatory regime that governs emergency response to natural 
disasters, with only a few treaties addressing a coordinated transnational emergency response to 
nuclear accidents. In the wake of the Chernobyl accident in 1986, two relatively narrow treaties 
were adopted. One, the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, was 
ratified by 116 nations, which agreed to notify the IAEA and all potentially affected nations if a 
nuclear accident occurs within their territory and has the potential to affect other nations (arts. 4-
 21
7).24 The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency, adopted the same year, requires that parties (it has so far been ratified by 111 
countries) notify the IAEA if they can provide assistance to member nations that experience a 
nuclear accident (art. 2).25 The IAEA is the focal organization for activating an inter-agency 
response to nuclear accidents, including facilitating the exchange of information between 
reporting and affected states and sharing information with other relevant international 
organizations and agencies. The Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear 
Emergencies (IACRNE) serves as the coordination mechanism for both preparedness and 
response of relevant international intergovernmental organizations (IAEA, 2013).   
After both Chernobyl and Fukushima, the IAEA sought to strengthen and expand its 
ability to effectively respond to nuclear accidents (IAEA, 2011). But its efforts were hampered 
by the exigencies of global politics. In the immediate aftermath of Fukushima, for example, the 
Japanese government requested assistance directly from the US because it did not want some 
member nations of the IAEA to participate in the emergency response activities within Japan 
(Banyan Analytics, 2014). 
As one might expect, individual nation states also lack coordinated international nuclear 
response plans that could facilitate an effective response to nuclear accidents beyond their 
borders (Banyan Analytics, 2014). For example, the U.S. response to domestic nuclear accidents 
is codified under the Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response 
                                                        
24 See International Atomic Energy Agency, International Conventions and Legal Agreements: Convention on Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cenna.html (accessed 
Nov. 18, 2014) (providing background information on the treaty). 
25 See International Conventions and Legal Agreements: Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency, International Atomic Energy Agency, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cacnare.html (accessed Nov. 18, 2014) (providing 
background information on the treaty). 
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Framework (Department of Defense, 2008). The Annex (Department of Defense, 2008) 
“describes the policies, situations, concepts of operations, and responsibilities of the Federal 
departments and agencies governing the immediate response and short term recovery activities.” 
But there is no corresponding document organizing the U.S. response to international nuclear 
accidents (Banyan Analytics, 2014). Moreover, the Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
Program (REPP), which was updated in 2013 to include policies for more effective interagency 
(for example, between the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA)) and governmental (Federal, State, local, and tribal) coordination, 
does not address the U.S. response to international nuclear incidents (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013).26 
 In sum, transnational mechanisms for providing emergency assistance for nuclear 
accidents remain limited in scope. They are also frequently distinct from well-established 
international humanitarian aid structures. Transnational nuclear response organizations would 
benefit from enhanced collaboration in responding to the immediate and devastating 
consequences of nuclear accidents (Calvi-Parisetti, 2013). 
3. Nuclear Disaster Victim Compensation 
It is in the area of nuclear disaster victim compensation that one finds the most visible 
evidence of a global regulatory regime, which rests on the existence of well-established national 
regulations. Yet even there, none of the extant international instruments bind all nations with 
nuclear capability. Moreover, although a compensation structure exists, it is woefully 
                                                        
26 It did, however, seek to “[i]ntegrate lessons learned and corrective actions from the Japan Fukushima disaster.” 
Department of Homeland Security. 2013. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness, Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional Justification, 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/budget/11c_fema_radiological_emergency_preparedness_program_dhs_fy13_cj.pd
f. 
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underfinanced, which either leaves many nuclear accident victims under-compensated or un-
compensated and/or puts the government at risk of financing victim compensation. The difficulty 
of determining the “real” cost of nuclear accidents exacerbates the financing problem; because 
the health and environmental consequences of a nuclear accident might not become manifest for 
many years, anticipating the financial demands of victim compensation is extremely difficult 
(Faure and Fiore, 2008). 
Despite the difficulties of assessing the potential consequences of a nuclear accident, 
along with the realization that the consequences could be incalculably high, countries interested 
in developing the capacity to produce nuclear power in the postwar period realized that they 
needed to assure their citizens that a system was in place to deal with the possibility of a 
domestic nuclear accident. Because national regulators understood that the consequences of a 
nuclear accident would not be confined to national borders, they needed some way of assuring 
their citizens that they would be protected in the event of an accident in a nearby country.  
The first international treaty addressing nuclear accidents was the Paris Convention on 
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention), which was adopted on 
July 29, 1960 and entered into force on April 1, 1968.27 An OECD Convention that focuses on 
cross-border harms, the Paris Convention comes into play when a nuclear incident occurs in a 
nation that ratified the agreement and causes damage in another ratifying nation (Bernesconi, 
1988; IAEA, 2004).28 Soon after it was adopted, the Paris Convention was supplemented by the 
                                                        
27 See Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability: Latest Status of Ratifications or 
Accessions, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-
convention-ratification.html (last modified June 10, 2009) (providing background information and status of 
ratifications and accessions) [Hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
28 See Christophe Bernasconi, Civil Liability Resulting from Transfrontier Environmental Damage: A Case for 
Hague Conference?, at 5 (Dec. 20, 1988), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd8e.pdf (providing an overview of 
the Paris and Vienna Conventions); IAEA, 2004. The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: Explanatory Texts, 
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Brussels (Supplementary) Convention of January 31, 1963, which established a system whereby 
all signatories of the Paris Convention would use public money to contribute to a compensation 
fund if the funds set aside under the Paris Convention were inadequate (Nuclear Energy Agency, 
2012).29 In 2004, both the Paris and Brussels Conventions were amended, largely in an effort to 
increase liability levels in the event of an accident. Under the amendments, which have not yet 
come into force, victims of nuclear accidents will be guaranteed a €1.5 billion compensation 
fund, with €700 million coming from the owner/operator of the facility, €500 million from the 
state where the accident occurred, and €300 million from the pool of funds contributed by 
members of the Convention (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2011).30 
The relatively limited scope of the Paris Convention, which focused on the nations of 
Western Europe, led to the passage of a second international nuclear energy treaty, the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, adopted May 21, 1963 and entered into force 
on November 12, 1977 (Bernesconi, 1988; IAEA, 2004). 31 32 Similar in substance to the Paris 
Convention, the Vienna Convention, which had 40 parties as of January 2014 (but which had 
been ratified by only a small number of nations) reaches far beyond Western Europe, and falls 
                                                        
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-5expltext.pdf (providing background to Paris and 
Vienna Conventions and the motivation driving their implementation). 
29 See Adisianya, Anthony. “Different Compensation Systems Under Nuclear Liability Conventions,” The Centre 
for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy (May 16, 2011), 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/?news=31321 (comparing different nuclear liability regimes on issues of 
coverage, liability limitations, and the relevance of national law). 
30 See Nuclear Energy Agency. 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-
convention-protocol.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2014) (providing background information on the Protocol).  
31 See IAEA. 2004. The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 Convention 
on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, at 4, 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-5expltext.pdf (listing “the special nature of nuclear 
hazards and the possibility that a nuclear incident might cause damage of an extreme magnitude and involve the 
nationals of more than one country” as the primary motivators behind the international effort for a global nuclear 
energy treaty). 
32 A 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage broadened the scope of 
the 1963 Vienna Convention and increased the amount of liability an operator of a nuclear facility faced. Protocol to 
Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage arts. 2–13, Sept. 29, 1997, IAEA-
INFCIRC/566. 
 25
under the auspices of the IAEA (IAEA, 2014g). 33 As a result of amendments in 1997, the 
liability limit for operators of nuclear energy facilities was set at approximately $400 million 
(IAEA, 2014g).  
The Vienna and Paris Conventions operated independently until September 21, 1988, 
when a Joint Protocol was signed (Bernesconi, 1988). The Joint Protocol treated any nation that 
signed it as if it were a party to both the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention 
(Bernesconi, 1988; IAEA, 2004).34 The 1986 Chernobyl incident convinced regulators that they 
needed a broader, more global civil liability regime for nuclear incidents (Bernesconi, 1988; 
IAEA, 2004). In 2004, Amending Protocols were signed to better link the Paris and Vienna 
Conventions, increase compensation levels, and shift some of the financial burden of 
compensation from government to industry (IAEA, 2004). 
The Paris and Vienna Conventions are grounded in a similar set of principles. Both 
provide compensation in the event of death, personal injury, or property loss caused by a nuclear 
accident occurring in a nuclear facility or during the transport of nuclear substances to or from a 
nuclear facility (Bernesconi, 1988). Under the Conventions, operators of nuclear facilities are 
strictly liable for the harms that result from nuclear accidents, meaning that accident victims do 
not have to demonstrate that the owners/operators were at fault (though as with strict liability 
                                                        
33 See IAEA. Conventions and Agreements: Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/vienna-convention-on-civil-liability-for-nuclear-damage 
(last updated Oct. 20, 2014) (providing an overview of the Vienna Convention); IAEA, Latest Status: Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/liability_status.pdf (last 
change of status Jan. 27, 2014) (Forty countries had ratified the Convention as of January 27, 2014, and thirteen 
countries, including Israel, Spain, and the United Kingdom, had signed but not yet ratified the Convention). 
34 Bernasconi, Christophe. 1988. Civil Liability Resulting from Transfrontier Environmental Damage: A Case for 
Hague Conference?, http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd8e.pdf. 
Thus, if a nuclear incident occurred for which an operator is liable under both the Vienna Convention and the Joint 
Protocol, the operator is liable not only for damage suffered in the territory of parties to both the Vienna Convention 
and the Joint Protocol, but also for damage suffered in the territory of parties to both the Paris Convention and the 
Joint Protocol. The converse is also true.  
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generally, victims are not relieved of the need to prove causation) (IAEA, 2014). Both 
Conventions cap the liability of operators, so that their obligation to pay compensation regardless 
of fault has a clear financial limit. Claims are governed by a statute of limitations that expires 
after ten years, although that period can be lengthened or shortened to a minimum of two years 
(under the Paris Convention) or three years (under the Vienna Convention) from the date 
claimants knew or should have known of their losses (IAEA, 2014). To ensure that payments are 
made in accordance with the Conventions, operators must maintain insurance or other financial 
security to cover their mandated liability limits; governments are expected to make up the 
difference if operators experience a shortfall; and compensation is paid regardless of a victim’s 
nationality, domicile or residence (IAEA, 2014). 
What one finds in the area of global governance and nuclear accident compensation, 
therefore, is a patchwork of international instruments, none of which bind the full complement of 
nations that produce and use nuclear energy, and none of which provide for adequate 
compensation in the event of a mid-level to serious accident. One simple fact illustrates the 
shortcomings of these international instruments: certain key countries, including Japan, South 
Korea, China, Canada, and the US, are not party to any international nuclear agreement, even 
though they account for more than 50% of the world’s nuclear reactors. 
Part of the reason why there has been such modest buy-in is that certain nations with 
significant stakes in nuclear energy do not share a view of what constitutes a desirable global 
approach. Two major nuclear-dependent countries, the US and France, have long disagreed 
about the best way to manage liability for nuclear accidents, with France pressing for a reliance 
on the Paris Convention and the Joint Protocols, and the US relying on domestic legislation (the 
Price-Anderson Act) to handle accident compensation. One potential breakthrough occurred in 
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late 2013, when the possibility of a more robust global regulatory regime suddenly emerged. It 
rests on the IAEA’s 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage 
(CSC), which takes as its goal the establishment of “a worldwide liability regime” that would 
“supplement and enhance” the Paris and Vienna Conventions, as well as national nuclear 
accident compensation systems (preamble). The CSC is also meant to “encourage regional and 
global co-operation to promote a higher level of nuclear safety in accordance with the principles 
of international partnership and solidarity” (preamble).  
Because it does not require that its parties are also parties to the Vienna Convention, Paris 
Convention, or other agreements, the CSC is appealing to countries like the US and Japan that 
rely on domestic legislation rather than global agreements to structure their liability systems for 
nuclear accidents. The CSC can only pass into force when ratified by countries that together 
account for approximately one third of the world’s nuclear energy, and as of July 2014 has been 
ratified only by the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Morocco, and Romania 
(IAEA, 2014). However, recent moves from key players in the nuclear arena suggest that the 
one-third threshold may soon be reached. In 2013, France, which had long opposed the CSC, 
signaled its support in a joint statement issued with the US, and both Canada and Japan also 
indicated that they would introduce legislation in an effort to ratify the CSC (Moinz and Martin, 
2013; World Nuclear News, 2013). When considered in conjunction with the European 
Commission on Energy’s announcement that it will soon introduce legislation seeking to 
harmonize EU nuclear accident insurance regimes—a development that seems poised to 
complement the approach of the CSC—the CSC offers the possibility of an increasingly global 
regulatory approach to liability for nuclear accidents. To the extent that the benefits of TLOs 
include the harmonization of national laws so as to eliminate repetitiveness and inconsistency, 
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and the creation of transnational dispute resolution mechanisms that rely on objective third party 
conflict resolvers, it appears that the management of nuclear accident liability and compensation 
may be moving, albeit slowly, in that direction.35 36 37 Still, the lack of a global enforcement 
mechanism to sanction countries that violate the provisions of the international nuclear accident 
compensation agreements makes clear that there is a long way to go before one can say that a 
TLO has taken hold in that area. 
III. Lessons from Fukushima: Barriers to the Creation of a TLO for Nuclear 
Disasters 
The 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Fukushima, Japan, followed by the nuclear accident at 
the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Daiichi and Daini nuclear power plants,38 well illustrate 
the inadequacies of both national and global disaster management.39 As described in Section 
II.A.2.a., the relative absence of TLOs in the area of disaster preparedness, combined with (and 
in part the result of) Japan’s lack of a domestic legal order for managing disasters, resulted in the 
                                                        
35 See Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon. 2008. “Introduction—Global Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective,” 16 Indiana J. Global Legal Stud. 388, 389 (describing the goal of the global constitutionalism 
movement as improving “the effectiveness and fairness of the international legal order”). 
36 See Vienna Convention, at 17 (noting that the IAEA came to the conclusion in the late 1980s that “the best 
solution would be the adoption of a new conventional instrument aimed at linking the two conventions”). 
37 See Peters & Armingeon, supra note 33, at 393 (“The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) new approach 
to systemic human rights deficiencies in certain member states can be seen as a shift away from redressing 
individual injuries, and to that extent as a more “public” law approach, by which the ECtHR assumes the role of a 
quasi-constitutional court.”). Note that the two treaties that arose after the Chernobyl disaster, requiring all ratifying 
nations to work closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency, established a centralized agency that acts as 
an objective third-party for dispute resolution among member nations. 
38 See Nottage, Luke, Hitoshi Nasu, and Simon Butt. 2014. “Disaster Management: Socio-Legal and Asia Pacific 
Perspectives,” in Simon Butt, Hitoshi Nasu, and Luke Nottage, eds., Asia-Pacific Disaster Management: 
Comparative and Socio-legal Perspectives. London: Springer (“Appendix A: Timeline of Japan’s ‘3/11’ Triple 
Disasters—Domestic and International Implications” provides a detailed timeline of the relevant events leading up 
to and following the triple-disaster). 
39 For an overview of the Japanese legal responses to the earthquake of 2011, see Umeda, Sayuri. Law Library of 
Congress, Global Legal Research Center. 2013. Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 
2011. http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-earthquake/Great-East-Japan-Earthquake.pdf. 
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country being unprepared when disaster struck.40 Domestic response to the earthquake and 
tsunami has been harshly criticized as slow and poorly organized, and although international 
disaster relief organizations offered their help, it was not always welcomed. Post-disaster 
compensation was unavailable, except for token payments from a fund offering condolence 
money and insurance payments for those few who happened to have earthquake policies. The 
result is that hundreds of thousands of people who lost their homes and their livelihoods may 
lack the financial resources to rebuild their lives, and a large number of people remain in 
temporary shelters.  
The most complex and contentious issues have involved compensation for those affected by 
the nuclear accident. As noted above, like many other key countries, Japan is not a signatory to 
any international nuclear liability conventions. Instead, Japan relies on domestic legislation, the 
1961 Nuclear Damage Compensation Act (NDCA), to structure its law on nuclear accident 
indemnification. Under the NDCA, which mimics the Paris Convention, nuclear power plant 
operators are strictly and exclusively liable for nuclear accidents. To meet their financial 
obligations, power providers are required to carry insurance that covers damages up to JPY 120 
billion (§§ 3,7).41  
 Several main principles animate the NDCA.  First, the NDCA subjects nuclear facility 
operators to strict, unlimited liability unless the damage is caused by a “grave natural disaster” (§                                                         
40 See Claremont, Yasuko. 2014. “Disaster in Japan: A Case Study,” in Simon Butt, Hitoshi Nasu, and Luke 
Nottage, eds., Asia-Pacific Disaster Management: Comparative and Socio-legal Perspectives. London: Springer 
(discussing Japan’s nuclear policy prior to the disaster); and Weitzdörfer, Julius. 2014. “Liability for Nuclear 
Damages Under Japanese Law: Key Legal Problems Arising from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident,” in 
Simon Butt, Hitoshi Nasu, and Luke Nottage, eds., Asia-Pacific Disaster Management: Comparative and Socio-
legal Perspectives. London: Springer (discussing the distinctive features of Japan’s nuclear liability regime).  
41 See Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2012. Japan’s 
Compensation System for Nuclear Damage: As Related to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident.  
http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/fukushima/7089-fukushima-compensation-system-pp.pdf (describing the legal 
framework undergirding Japan’s compensation system for nuclear damage).. 
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3). Although the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) attempted to avoid liability by 
claiming the 3/11 earthquake-tsunami-nuclear meltdown constituted a “grave natural disaster,” 
the Japanese government did not seriously consider the claim (Murayama, unpublished 
manuscript). Instead, as stated in the Final Report of the Diet’s Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation Commission (2012), the government proceeded as though the accident 
was “manmade,” a result of the failure of regulators and TEPCO to insure that the nuclear power 
plant was capable of withstanding natural disasters by implementing “basic safety requirements.”  
 Second, the NDCA mandates that funds for compensation be secured through either 
mandatory insurance or through an indemnity contract between the government and the nuclear 
power operator. In the case of Fukushima, because the insurance policies state that insurers are 
released from liability in the case of nuclear accidents caused by earthquakes or other natural 
disasters, victims were compensated by TEPCO with funds raised by indemnity contract.42  
Finally, if damage from a nuclear accident exceeds the JPY120 billion liability cap, the 
government has the prerogative of providing nuclear operators with financial assistance if the 
Government believes that doing so is consistent with and necessary to achieve the Act’s 
objectives (§16). Faced with compensation claims in the trillions of yen, the government has 
chosen to financially support TEPCO by issuing bonds, in return for which TEPCO is 
responsible both for repayment and for administering the compensation fund (Vásquez-Maignan, 
2011).  
Rather than creating a single, unified compensation system, Fukushima victims are 
eligible to seek compensation from any and all of three distinct routes. The first route—the direct 
route to compensation—is administered by TEPCO. It follows the guidelines of the Dispute                                                         
42 See Nuclear Damage Compensation Act, Act. No. 147 of 1961 (Japan), http://www.oecd-
nea/law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf. 
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Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation and is meant to respond to most 
losses caused by the nuclear accident. Rather than mandating a standard payment, TEPCO has 
been given a great deal of discretion to choose from a range of payment options.43 The second 
route –alternative dispute resolution (ADR)– was set up under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. Run by attorney-mediators commissioned 
by the government, the ADR route focuses on compensating categories of people not included in 
the guidelines, including children, the disabled, and pregnant women. The third route to 
compensation is litigation, and is available to both individuals and corporations. Dozens of cases 
have been filed, both within and beyond Japan, some involving individuals, others groups of 
individuals, and still others single or multiple corporations (Feldman, 2013).  
Japan’s effort to compensate the victims of the Fukushima nuclear accident illustrates two 
problems that a TLO addressing nuclear accident compensation must address. The first is Japan’s 
failure to create a well-coordinated set of compensation mechanisms, and to offer victims a 
roadmap that enables them to navigate the institutional landscape of compensation. Instead, 
victims can chose between three separate paths to compensation, with limited information about 
how best to position themselves with regard to those separate paths, or what to expect if they 
follow any given path. Facing a complex bureaucratic structure with multiple routes of entry, 
many victims have been unable to effectively pursue their claims.  
The second problem is even more serious. TEPCO’s mandated JPY 120 billion of insurance 
was a drop in the bucket when compared to the actual costs of the nuclear accident. As of August 
2014, TEPCO had already received over JPY 4.2496 trillion from the Nuclear Damage 
                                                        
43 See TEPCO. 2014. Records of Applications and Payouts for Indemnification of Nuclear Damage (as of 
10/3/2014), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/images/jisseki-e.pdf. (documenting that, as of August 2014, TEPCO 
has received applications from 1.95 million individuals and 279 thousand corporations/sole proprietorships, and has 
settled 1.863 million and 242 thousand claims, respectively). 
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Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation to disburse as compensation 
payments, and many experts believe that the bill will ultimately reach the JPY 10-15 trillion 
range (TEPCO, 2014). The result of this monumental underinsurance is that the Japanese 
government, i.e., the Japanese population more generally, is underwriting the real cost of 
TEPCO’s operations. And even so, many individuals and corporations beyond Japan that have 
been affected by the accident in Fukushima will remain uncompensated. 
IV. Responses Animated by Solidary: The French Regulatory Approach and the US 
Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks 
There are a variety of economic and political barriers to the creation of TLOs that govern 
disaster preparedness, response, and compensation, as the above sections of this chapter have 
discussed. The diversity of sociocultural and economic values undergirding individual nations 
also makes it difficult to create TLOs that govern disasters. As illustrated by the Fukushima 
disaster in Japan, the absence of both domestic and global regulatory mechanisms for national 
disaster preparation and response left a large number of people dead, injured, homeless and 
without hope. In the sphere of nuclear disasters, in which nations arguably have greater 
incentives to take actions to coordinate and create comprehensive cross border regulatory 
schemes, TLOs have also failed to take root, and the result is that many of those who suffered 
loss because of the Fukushima accident have yet to get their lives back on track.  
This section presents two examples of how nations have effectively managed disasters, 
and identifies a common value underlying both of them. The cases of the French regulatory 
response to natural disasters and the US’s September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, though 
distinctive in their approaches and national in scope, are both animated by the value of solidarity. 
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As such, they are suggestive of the potential form that a comprehensive and effective TLO might 
take in the area of disasters.  
a. The French CAT/NAT System 
In the French approach to compensating victims of natural disasters, one finds a regularized 
and inclusive system that socializes risk by spreading the cost of disaster related harms broadly 
throughout the populace (Bruggeman, 2010; Vandamme, 1998).44 45 It finds its justification in 
the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, which “proclaims the solidarity and equality of all 
French people in bearing the burden resulting from national calamities” (§ 12). Solidarity as a 
value animating the French system of disaster management has found expression in the 
willingness of citizens to pay an extra tax in 1976 to fund an assistance program for farmers 
suffering from severe drought and to sacrifice a vacation day to assist elderly victims of an 
unusually severe heat wave (Cannarsa, Lafay, and Moréteau, 2006; Consorcio de Compensación 
de Seguros, 2008; Moss, 1999). These expressions of solidarity indicate an expectation that the 
government will provide supplemental assistance to disaster victims facing personal injury or                                                         
44 Solidarity as a value undergirding the French preference to statist remedies raises the question of the difference 
between Japan and France—both powerful centralized governments with paternalistic tendencies in the realm of 
social policy—in terms of creating a nationalized policy for disasters. The tendency to generalize between the two 
countries in this manner obfuscates the myriad of areas in which strong, paternalistic states like France and Japan are 
quite individualistic, perhaps even more so in the case of Japan than that of France. There is, therefore, no reason to 
anticipate a statist approach to disaster management in the case of Japan. For an example of the divergent outcomes 
on policy of France and Japan see, e.g., Feldman, Eric A. 2000. “Blood Justice: Courts, Conflict, and Compensation 
in Japan, France, and the United States.” 34 L. & Soc. R. 651–701. 
45 See Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros. 2012. Estadística Riesgos Extraordinarios: Serie 1971 – 2011. 
Madrid: Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros (reporting statistics on catastrophes and risks in Spain); Consorcio 
de Compensación de Seguros. 2008. Natural Catastrophe Insurance Cover: a Diversity of Systems. Madrid: 
Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros (outlining the disaster insurance systems across a broad range of countries);  
Faure, Michael. 2006. “Comparative and Policy Conclusions,” in Michael Faure and Tom Hartlief, eds., Financial 
Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: a Comparative Legal Approach. Vienna: SpringerWienNewYork 
(comparing the legal approaches for compensating disaster victims in different countries, including Austria, 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States); and Van den Bergh, 
Roger. 2006. “Compulsory Catastrophe Extension of First Party Property Insurance from a Competition Policy 
Perspective” in Michael Faure and Tom Hartlief, eds., Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: a 
Comparative Legal Approach. Vienna: SpringerWeinNewYork (describing three different schemes for 
compensating catastrophe victims: ad hoc solutions, disaster funds, and catastrophe extensions of first party property 
insurance policies). 
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property loss, as well as a willingness to embrace present sacrifice with the expectation of future 
reciprocity.  
French compensation for victims of natural disasters has several distinctive features.46 First, 
the disaster management system as a whole reflects a general for insurance over tort liability as a 
means to provide redress for a wrong (Cannarsa, Lafay, and Moréteau, 2006; Moréteau, 2010).47 
The system does not impose specific limitations on an individual’s ability to submit tort claims 
against the government or private actors. Instead, it is structured to disincentivize the submission 
of tort claims by providing an alternative—insurance—that is both less expensive and 
normatively superior because it is associated with social solidarity.  
Second, because France has a robust social security system that covers the cost of treating 
physical harms—disaster related or otherwise—it has little need for a system that guarantees 
compensation for disaster-specific physical injuries. Instead, the social security system provides 
for health care, workplace injuries, old age pensions, lost wages, unemployment payments, and 
more, for close to 100% of residents (Bruggerman, 2010; Cannarsa, Lafay, and Moréteau, 2006; 
CMU.fr, 2014).48 A competitive private insurance market sells policies that cover the 30% of the 
cost of care that remains after social security. Moreover, low-income individuals who are priced 
out of the private insurance market are not left without healthcare coverage. Instead, they are 
                                                        
46 For a comparison of attitudes and expectations for disaster relief in the United States and France, see Moss, 
David. 1999. “Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803,” in Kenneth A. Froot, 
ed., The Financing of Catastrophe Risk. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (outlining the advantages and 
disadvantages should the United States adopt a disaster insurance scheme similar to that of France). 
47 For a discussion of the American preference to tort liability to insurance schemes for disaster compensation, see, 
e.g., Moréteau, Olivier. 2010. “Catastrophic Harm in United States Law.” 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 69 (discussing the 
American preference to use tort liability to compensate disaster victims due to the “weakness of the American 
welfare system by comparison to other developed countries…”). 
48 There are several different health insurance plans—for the employed, self-employed, agricultural workers, etc.—
but all operate in almost the same way and provide similar benefits. 
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covered through the Couverture Maladie Universelle (CMU), a program started in 1999 to ensure 
that some form of healthcare coverage was available to all French residents.49  
Third, it is with regard to property insurance that the French system is especially innovative. 
In response to the acute losses suffered by some citizens because of natural disaster-related 
property damage, legislation passed on July 13, 1982 dramatically altered the system of natural 
disaster indemnification in France by creating what is known at the CAT/NAT regime (Loi 82-
600 du 13 juillet 1982).50 Under this system, the voluntary purchase of basic homeowners 
insurance triggers the obligation to pay an additional premium for insurance against natural 
disaster-related property losses and business interruptions (Bruggeman, 2010).51 Because over 
95% of homeowners purchase first party insurance, and the liability limit of the CAT/NAT 
policy is the same as the limit of the underlying insurance policy, the coverage for natural 
disaster-related loss under the CAT/NAT is particularly broad. Moreover, priced at around 25 
euros—12 % of the 200 euro annual cost of a typical homeowners insurance policy— the 
CAT/NAT regime has increased coverage for natural disasters without causing a decrease in the 
number of individuals purchasing first party homeowners insurance (Raspiller, 2010). When one 
                                                        
49 Since 2000, the French government has also enabled people to purchase modestly priced (starting at 15 
euros/month/family) life and injury insurance through a policy it calls “guarantee for accidents of life” insurance 
(garantie des accidents de la vie). The insurance provides up to 1M euros of coverage for death, injury, economic 
loss, pain and suffering. So far, only 10% of population has purchased it. See Bruggeman, Véronique. 2010. 
Compensating Catastrophe Victims: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach. NY: Wolters Kluwer; 
Cannarsa, Michel, Fabien Lafay, and Olivier Moréteau. 2006. “France,” in Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief, eds., 
Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Comparative Legal Approach. Vienna: 
SpringerWienNewYork.  
50 See generally Cannarsa, Michel, Fabien Lafay, and Olivier Moréteau. 2006. “France,” in Michael Faure and Ton 
Hartlief, eds., Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Comparative Legal Approach. Vienna: 
SpringerWienNewYork. 
51 The CAT/NAT system is designed to cover “uninsurable” risks, including earthquakes, landslides, floods, 
tsunami, and more. But it does not cover risks for which insurance is available, like wind damage, hail, or collapse 
from snow. Bruggeman, Véronique. 2010. Compensating Catastrophe Victims: A Comparative Law and Economics 
Approach. NY: Wolters Kluwer. Both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages are recoverable to the extent they were 
a direct and immediate consequence of the natural disaster, as are lost earnings. Curiously, the cost of temporary 
housing is not covered by CAT/NAT insurance. 
 36
counts the 6% mandatory upcharge on all automobile insurance policies to insure against natural 
disaster-related loss and the fact that the vast majority of French residents purchase automobile 
and/or homeowners insurance, the CAT/NAT regime has provided almost universal natural 
disaster coverage (of some kind) for French residents (Cannarsa, Lafay, and Moréteau, 2006).52 
Although the CAT/NAT system is a creation of the central government, it depends upon the 
participation of private insurance companies, which at the onset were reluctant to expose 
themselves to potentially significant liabilities by entering an insurance market about which they 
had limited information. The government’s success in securing the participation of private 
insurers resulted from its decision to set up a state-funded re-insurance company, the Caisse 
Centrale de Réassurance (CCR), which reinsures 50% of the risk of disaster insurance policies at 
an extremely competitive rate.53 The system is extremely attractive for private insurers, who 
retain 50% of the risk and sell the remaining 50% to the CCR at a very competitive rate. The 
government provides CCR with a financial guarantee, stepping in to pay the excess liability 
when 90% of the CCR’s reserves are depleted (von Ungern-Sternberg, 2014).54 To increase the 
                                                        
52 A July 2003 law extended first-party insurance coverage to damage caused by industrial catastrophes for an 
additional 5 euro/year premium, and also established a compensation fund for uninsured victims of such 
catastrophes. See Cannarsa, Michel, Fabien Lafay, and Olivier Moréteau. 2006. “France,” in Michael Faure and Ton 
Hartlief, eds., Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Comparative Legal Approach. Xx: Springer. 
The justification for extending natural disaster insurance to industrial disasters has been challenged, given the far 
greater likelihood of successfully pursuing tort remedies in the aftermath of an industrial accident. 
53 Because the CCA is a government agency and enjoys significant state backing, it has a virtual monopoly over 
reinsurance in the natural disasters market. That lack of competition led SCOR, a large French reinsurance company, 
to challenge the constitutionality of the 1982 law and the financial guarantee by the government provided to CCR. 
The CCR argued that the 1982 was aimed at indemnifying policyholders against uninsurable risks, and that the norm 
of solidarity required low premiums and state support. In its view, the importance of creating such a system 
outweighed the value of free compensation, which it notes is not a constitutional principle. In a September 27, 2013 
decision, the Constitutional Court sided with the CCR and upheld the constitutionality of the provision. Conseil 
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court, decision No. 2013-344 QPC, Sept. 27, 2013, J.O. 16306 (Fr.), available 
at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/cc2013344qpc.pdf. 
54 Indeed, the state has had to support CCR on a number of occasions, as when it paid large claims in 1987, 1999 
and 2003. While the CCR boasts a rating of “AA+” from Standard & Poor’s (History, CCR Homepage, 
http://www.ccr.fr/index.do?fid=1557851382829023455 (accessed Sept. 28, 2013)), the financial reserves of the 
CCR required an injection of nearly 460 million Euros in 1999 to remain afloat.  
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financial soundness of the system in response to the onslaught of claims from the 1982/3 floods, 
the government authorized a rate increase from the original property insurance upcharge of 5.5% 
to 9%. This initial increase, which later rose to 12%, provided a profit for private insurers while 
allowing CCR to slowly build its reserves in the disaster-light years of 1984-88 (Bidan, 2000). 
Other changes, like restricting the causal link between natural disasters and property losses and 
narrowly tailoring the definition of natural disasters, further shored up the system’s sustainability 
(Bidan, 2000).55 
Importantly, insurance premiums under the CAT/NAT regime are uniform, calculated as a 
fixed percentage of the cost of the underlying policy regardless of the risk factors of the insured 
(Picard, 2000). This aspect of CAT/NAT invites questions of moral hazard, in particular the 
possibility that the value of solidarity is undermined by individuals who take inappropriate risks 
(e.g., living on the banks of flood-prone rivers) knowing that they can spread their disaster-
related losses among the general population. But French regulators are skeptical that anyone 
would consciously and willingly increase the possibility of being victimized by a natural disaster, 
and downplay the role of moral hazard in affecting individual behavior (Picard, 2000). 
In addition to limiting coverage to natural disasters, defined as natural phenomenon of 
“abnormal” intensity, the CAT/NAT system also incentivizes the implementation of prevention 
policies in the form of risk prevention plans (Plan de Prévention des Risques Majeurs – PPR).56 
Created by municipalities, usually local mayors, PPRs provide detailed outlines of their efforts to 
                                                        
55 For an extended government discussion of CAT/NAT, see Note 2004-0304-01 due 5 octobre 2005 Rapport de 
Synthese: Mission d’enquête sur le régime d’indemnisation des victimes de catastrophes naturelles [Note 2004-
0304-01 of Oct. 5, 2005, Summary: Investigation into the Compensation Regime for Victims of Natural Disasters], 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/064000106/0000.pdf. 
56 See Poussin, Jennifer K., W.J. Wouter Bouzen, and Jeroen C.J.H. Aerts. 2013. “Stimulating Flood Damage 
Mitigation Through Insurance: an Assessment of the French CatNat System.” 12: 3-4 Environmental Hazards 258, 
261–64 (describing PPRs created for mitigation of damage caused by floods). 
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minimize the potential harms caused by natural disasters. Two major incentives guide 
municipalities to create efficient and effective PPRs. First, failure to create a PPR exposes 
municipalities to the possibility of tort litigation by local residents. Second, it also enables the 
central government to increase the deductible on the CAT/NAT policy with subsequent 
declarations of natural disaster—twice as high the third time disaster strikes, three times as high 
the forth, and so on. In turn, this provides local residents the incentive to place pressure on their 
municipalities to create a PPR or face the political consequences of being voted out of office if 
they fail to do so.  
France’s approach to disaster compensation is therefore both effective and, apart from 
sharing some similarities with the Spanish and Belgian approaches, distinctive.57 The value of 
solidarity animating its structure has both capitalized on and enhanced a culture of mutual 
sacrifice and reciprocity and catalyzed the growth of a profitable enterprise for private insurance 
companies and the state-run CCR.  
b. The U.S. Response to 9/11 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 killed over 2,977 people and injured many more 
(CNN Library, 2014). Beyond the death and physical injuries, it wrought both social and 
economic devastation—families and communities were fractured, and property damage was so 
vast that the site of the former World Trade Center was given the name “ground zero,” evoking 
the complete destruction of nuclear war.                                                          
57 There are several other countries with disaster compensation programs similar to that in France, in particular 
Spain and Belgium. For a comparison of the French and Spanish approaches, see von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas. 
Catastrophe Insurance: Spain vs. France, University of Lausanne, Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/37781875.pdf  (accessed Nov. 18, 2014) (comparing the shortcomings of 
France’s compulsory catastrophe insurance regime with the successes of that of Spain). See also Note 2004-0304-01 
due 5 octobre 2005 Rapport de Synthese: Mission d’enquête sur le régime d’indemnisation des victimes de 
catastrophes naturelles [Note 2004-0304-01 of Oct. 5, 2005, Summary: Investigation into the Compensation Regime 
for Victims of Natural Disasters], http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-
publics/064000106/0000.pdf. 
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In the past, the U.S. government’s response to disasters generally reflected a discomfort with 
paternalism and a disinterest in principles of social solidarity.58 9/11, however, was different. In 
addition to the magnitude of the devastation and the deep wounds inflicted on the national 
psyche by an act of terrorism, the large number of potential liability claims posed a threat to the 
solvency of the American aviation industry (In re September 11 Litigation, 2009).59 As a result, 
eleven days after the attacks, the government stepped in by enacting the Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA, 2001).  
The ATSSSA delineated two remedies for claimants. Those who chose to file civil suits 
against the airlines were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Southern District of New 
York, a strategy designed to streamline claims processing, insulate the airline industry from 
devastating liability, and ensure equity among claimants (In re September 11 Litigation, 2009, 
quoting 147 Cong. Rec. S9589–01, S9595, 2001).60 The ATSSSA placed restrictions on 
claimants who chose to pursue civil litigation, including caps on defendants’ liability and the 
elimination of punitive damages (494 F.Supp.2d 232 (S.D.N.Y.2007)). 
                                                        
58 See, e.g., 2 de Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America 120 (Henry Reeve trans., 
1862) ("[Americans] owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always 
considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own 
hands."). This anti-paternalistic ethos is embodied in the wake of disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, the bombing 
of U.S.S Cole, and other disasters, whose victims were largely left to fend for themselves. See Feinberg, Kenneth R. 
“9/11 Fund: Once Was Enough,” Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/10/AR2008091002721.html (noting, in reference to the 9/11 Victim Compensation 
Fund, that “[n]ever before in American history has there been an example of such taxpayer generosity” and 
comparing it to disasters occurring before and after September 2001). 
59 See also Assessing Losses for the Airline Industry in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks, Joint Economic 
Committee Democratic Staff, Senator Jack Reed (Oct. 3, 2001), at http://www.airlinebailout1.pdf from 
jec.senate.gov (the airline carriers’ insurance coverage was reportedly $1.6 billion per plane, an amount insufficient 
to cover the scope of the death, destruction, and injury on the ground). 60 In re September 11 Litigation, 600 F.Supp.2d 551, (S.D.N.Y.2009), quoting 147 Cong. Rec. S9589–01, S9595 
(Sept. 21, 2001) (Senator McCain: “In addition to removing the specter of devastating potential liability from the 
airlines, and guaranteeing that the victims and their families will receive compensation regardless of the outcomes of 
the tangle of lawsuits that will ensue, the bill attempts to provide some sense to the litigation by consolidating all 
civil litigation arising from the terrorist attacks of September 11 in one court.”). 
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More significantly, the ATSSSA created a second route to compensation, the no-fault 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (the Fund), under which a Special Master evaluated 
wrongful death and personal injury claims (In re September 11 Litigation, 2009). Those who 
filed claims with the Fund were required to waive their right to sue the airlines, airline 
manufacturers, airport owners, individuals or entities with a property interest in the World Trade 
Center, and New York City (§§ 403(C)(B)(i), 405(c)(3)(C)(i)).61 In addition, to be eligible for 
compensation from the Fund, claimants were required to have been “physically injured or killed 
as a result of the terrorist-related air crashes… (§ 403).” This included individuals who were (1) 
present at the World Trade Center or other related crash site at the time or in the immediate 
aftermath of the crash and (2) suffered physical harm or death resulting from the crash itself or 
debris removal, as well as (3) the representative of a decedent who would otherwise have been 
eligible (§§ 405(c)(2)(A)(i)–(ii); 405(c)(2)(B)).62  Those who met the eligibility requirements did 
not have to prove that their harms resulted from the fault of another party, and were able to avoid 
the costs of a traditional civil suit (In re September 11 Litigation, 2009). 
In creating the ATSSSA, therefore, Congress not only protected the airline industry from the 
possibility of devastating legal liability. It also quite explicitly offered “unprecedented 
expression of compassion on the part of the American people to the victims and their families 
devastated by the horror and tragedy on September 11th (Department of Justice, 2001).” Kenneth 
R. Feinberg (2004), tapped as Special Master of the Fund by Attorney General John Ashcroft 
after the ATSSSA’s enactment, called the Fund “a unique response to an unprecedented 
                                                        
61 Special Master Kenneth R. Feinberg allowed for the fact that some victims will receive nothing after setoffs, 
although noted that such a scenario was unlikely. See, Feinberg, Kenneth R., Special Master. 2001. Transcript, News 
Conference Announcing Regulations Concerning 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund 8 (Dec. 20, 2001), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/1220kenfeinbergnewsconference.htm. 
62 Individuals deemed by the Attorney General to have acted as participants or conspirators in the terrorist attacks 
were also deemed ineligible to file a claim with the VCF. ATASSA § 405(c)(2)(C). 
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historical event” catalyzed by the “profound conditions” and the “sense of national grief and 
compassion” associated with the attacks of September 11th. Representative Harry J. Waxman 
(2001) summarized the national ethos embodied in the Fund when he stated, “In the aftermath of 
the September 11 attacks, our nation has learned to put a premium on the value of shared 
sacrifice.”63 Like France’s approach to managing the property losses caused by disasters, the US 
response to 9/11 was deeply rooted in and explicitly justified by the value of solidarity.  
To date, the Fund remains unique among American responses to disasters. Arguments in the 
aftermath of September 11th to enact a statute establishing such a fund upon certification by the 
Secretary of State in the event of a future terrorist attack failed to gain traction. Feinberg (2004) 
himself has argued against the prudence of such legislation. Instead, he has suggested that the 
conditions in the aftermath of a disaster ought to guide the decision to enact such a public 
compensation scheme in the future, although Congress should debate the merits of the Act and 
identify possible alternatives. Some of Feinberg’s suggestions have been borne out more 
recently, such as in as the Gulf Coast compensation fund he administered for BP and his latest 
role administering a fund created and paid for by General Motors to compensate victims of its 
ignition switch failures (Nocera, 2014). The Fund has, at least, catalyzed debates about whether 
it is practical and/or desirable to replicate it in the event of future disasters, and, if not, what 
forms future compensation schemes might take. 
V. Conclusion 
Scholars of law and regulation persuasively argue that transnational legal institutions are 
playing an increasingly important role in how nations manage social problems. Halliday and 
                                                        
63 Waxman, Henry A. 147 CONG. REC. 130 (2001), at http://capitolwords.org/date/2001/10/02/E1764_air-
transportation-safety-and-system-stabilization/. Note that Representative Waxman said this a speech criticizing H.R. 
2926, the ATSSSA legislation. 
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Shaffer (2014a) offer a valuable approach to that phenomenon, labeling the emergence of cross-
national legal norms, organizations, and actors that “order the understanding and practice of law 
across national jurisdictions” as “transnational legal orders.” But the general trend toward 
“transnationalization” is not without exceptions, as this chapter on law and disasters has 
demonstrated. To the degree that TLOs have emerged in the law and disasters area, they are most 
visible when it comes to emergency response to natural disasters, only partially visible in the 
area of disaster prediction/prevention, and largely invisible in the area of victim compensation.   
In an increasingly globalized environment, where transnational regulatory regimes play 
significant roles across a broad swath of fields, the relative lack of TLOs in the area of natural 
and nuclear disasters is notable. The frequency with which disasters strike, their relative 
ubiquity, and their border-crossing nature invite the creation of transnational global governance 
mechanisms. Yet for both natural and nuclear disasters, particularly in the areas of 
prediction/prevention and victim compensation, TLOs have largely failed to materialize.  
What explains the gap between the literature on global governance, with its recognition of 
the increasingly importance of TLOs, and the relative resistance to TLOs in the law/disasters 
area? First, the many areas in which TLOs have emerged were subject to significant amounts of 
domestic legal control. From women’s rights to environmental toxins, banking to immigration, 
the fields most ripe for TLOs were already robust national legal orders, and thus primed for 
cross-border legalization. Not so for most areas of disaster management, which are generally 
underdeveloped domestic legal orders burdened by high degrees of uncertainty and a potentially 
high price tag. A second, related reason for minimal TLO development in the area of disasters is 
the lack of a shared sense of reciprocal risk. To the extent that one finds TLOs in the nuclear 
area, they rest on the notion that an accident in one nation will have negative consequences in 
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other (nearby) nations. There is no similar equation for natural disasters, which can easily be 
conceived of as resulting from external forces and causing geographically specific harms. The 
reality, of course, is that natural phenomenon become natural disasters because of human 
agency—where we locate our towns, how we build our homes—and their consequences are often 
felt in many nations. But there is a randomness to natural disasters, along with a difficulty of 
predicting their consequences and a lack of clarity between what constitutes a natural versus and 
human-made disaster which has worked against the construction of cross-national legal 
institutions.  
The immense direct economic losses that can result from natural disasters also contribute to 
the lack of disaster-related TLO’s. Those costs make it difficult to consolidate political support 
for the creation of policies and programs aimed at managing disasters, when doing so could 
mean that significant funds will be redirected to disaster management at unpredictable times. The 
problem is particularly acute in low to medium income countries, which have a large number of 
other pressing and immediate financial needs and may have difficulty setting aside funds for 
“unpredictable” natural disasters. Ad hoc, post hoc programs thus become the dominant 
institutional posture when disasters strike. 
Of course, as discussed in the preceding sections, there is not a complete dearth of TLOs 
targeted at disasters. They are more common for nuclear than natural disasters, and in the area of 
natural disasters those that do exist tend to involve emergency response rather than disaster 
predication/preparation of post-disaster compensation. The nuclear/natural divide results in part 
from the political compromise that enabled the growth of the nuclear energy enterprise: 
governments and nuclear plant owners had to develop mechanisms to help lessen public fear of 
nuclear energy, which resulted in various international agreements. The stronger inclination to 
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cooperate in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster can be at least partially explained by 
the human impulse to aid those in distress; the medical emergencies people experience enable 
them to receive emergency treatment in hospitals, for example, even when further treatment or 
accident compensation is not available. Moreover, emergency response is clearly bounded. It 
starts in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and ends relatively quickly, unlike the open-ended 
commitment of time and money required by serious efforts at disaster prediction and 
compensation.  
The paucity of TLOs in the area of law and disasters is not simply a conceptual puzzle. It has 
profound human consequences. In 2011, the estimated cost of losses from natural disasters 
worldwide was a staggering $380 billion (Ferris and Petz, 2011).64 Japan’s Fukushima disaster, 
with a price tag of over $200 billion, has the unfortunate distinction of being the costliest in 
history, (Ferris and Petz, 2011) with direct economic losses representing 4% of Japans GDP and 
only 16% of total losses being covered by insurance (Mahul and White, 2012). The cost of 
disasters is even more severe for middle-income countries. The 2010 earthquake/tsunami in 
Chile, for example, resulted in $30 billion in economic losses representing 18% of GDP. 
Everywhere, the cost of disasters is widespread, far-reaching, and often difficult to calculate due 
to the long-term effects including constraining national budgets and hindering economic growth 
and development (Mahul and White, 2012). 
 Given the demonstrated costs of disasters, the development of a coordinated and 
consistent regulatory apparatus in the area of law and disasters is critical. Here, the French 
                                                        
64 The cost of natural disasters worldwide for 2009, 2010, and 2011 was USD 41.3, 123.9, and 380 billion, 
respectively. Ferris, Elizabeth, and Daniel Petz. 2011. The Year that Shook the Rich: a Review of Natural Disasters 
in 2011, Brookings Institution – London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/3/natural%20disaster%20review%20ferris/03_natural
_disaster_review_ferris.pdf.  
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approach to disaster insurance and U.S. response to 9/11 may provide a foundation for the 
growth of a transnational regulatory apparatus in the area of law and disasters. Although the two 
regimes differ considerably, both programs were animated by a value—social solidarity—which 
was widely internalized and accepted by both policy makers and the public.65 The ability of the 
social solidarity norm to effectively motivate disaster compensation regimes in two countries 
with such different social and political values is suggestive of its potential to undergird the 
creation of law and disaster TLOs across a broad spectrum of nations. When that occurs, we will 
know that the predictions of a truly globalized international legal order will have finally proven 
true.  
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